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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
WILLS -

TOTTEN TRUSTS - DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE
OF DEPOSIT AFTER INVASION BY WIDOW

Decedent's will gave everything to his widow, but prior to his death he
established four savings bank accounts in his own name in trust for a grandchild, the passbooks being retained by decedent. The widow instituted an
action for deterniination as to whether these accounts were a part of the
estate, contending that the transfers were illusory. The Surrogate ruled that
the trust accounts (Totten trusts) belonged entirely to the estate and passed
in toto to the widow under the will. Held: decree modified. The Totten trusts
are illusory only to the extent that they encroach upon the widow's distributive
share under Sections 18 and 83 of the New York Decedent Estate Law. The
amount of the deposits is to be added to the value of the.rest of the estate to
determine the widow's share, and the balance of the trusts remaining after her
expectancy is satisfied goes to the beneficiary of the trusts. Application of
Halpern, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 894 (Ist Dep't 1950).
It is a generally accepted principle that if the settlor of a trust reserves
not only the power to revoke and modify but also the power to deal with the
trust property as his own, the intended trust becomes a testamentary disposition and is invalid unless it complies with the Statute of Wills. I SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 354. An exception to this rule is recognized in New York
where the creation of a savings bank deposit in the name of the depositor in
trust for the benefit of another, the settlor retaining power to make deposits or
withdrawals during his lifetime, results in a tentative trust. Though revocable
at will, there is a presumption that an absolute trust was created as to the
balance on hand at the death of the depositor. Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y.
112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
Totten trusts, however, are not fully effective for all purposes. When the
depositor dies insolvent, or if the remaining assets of the estate are insufficient
to pay the debts, creditors can reach the Totten trust deposit. Beakes Dairy
Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't 1908); Matter
of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surf. Ct. 1937). Similarly,
the deposits may be resorted to for the purpose of paying funeral and administration expenses. Matter of Greniewich, 243 App. Div. 811, 278 N. Y. Supp.
279 (2d Dep't 1935) ; Mann v. Shrive, II1 App. Div. 452, 97 N. Y. Supp. 688
(2d Dep't 1906); Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp 623 (Surr.
Ct. 1933). Any excess however, goes to the trust beneficiary; the presumption
of the trust being absolute is rebutted only to the extent necessary to make
these- payments. Mann v.Shrive and Matter of Reich, supra.
A widow may attack a Totten trust since as to her the transfer is illusory
and in contravention of her rights under § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law.
Krause v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. 2d 779 (1941); Steixner v. Bowery
Savings Bank, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949). [Section 18 gives a surviv-
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ing spouse a personal right of election against the will, allowing her to take
her share of the estate as in intestacy, i.e., as provided by Section 83, but with
certain limitations and exceptions, so that her elective share may be somewhat
less than she would take in intestacy.]
The ability to invoke § 18 to defeat an illusory trust has been held not to
be dependent upon the existence of a will against which the widow could elect
to take. Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N. Y. 889, 62 N. E. 2d 785 (1945) ; Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941);
contra: Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
915 (lst Dep't 1939).
The above decisions lead to the conclusion that Totten trusts in net effect
are analogous to testamentary dispositions. The fiction, perhaps induced by
a desire for convenience, is evidence of an underlying judicial policy to surmount the obstacles of formality required by the Statute of Wills.
Where the will provides for the widow the minimum statutory benefits
required by § 18, she has no right of election. Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371,
9 N. E. 2d 966 (1937) ; In re Kalinds Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 775
(Surr. Ct. 1945). But, though possessing no right of election, the widow can
maintain an action to set aside illusory transfers. Newman v. Dore. The grievance of the widow relates not to direct violation of § 18 but to evasion thereof
by an apparent but not real reduction of the quantum of the estate. Schnakenberg v. Schrakenberg,supra.
A re-examination of the meaning of the word "illusory" may be helpful
in considering the problems of the present case. This word has at times been
used somewhat indiscriminately in the cases, as the decisions already noted
may suggest. Newman v. Dore, supra, is the leading case on illusory trusts;
there the testator set up a revocable trust whereby he reserved the right to
enjoy all of the income for life and the power to control the trustees as well.
Testator's will gave his widow a life income in one third of his estate so that
she was barred from an election; but since the trust disposed of all of his
property there was no effective provision for her. The court held that the trust
failed entirely upon the widow's challenge so that all of the trust corpus was
distributed according to the will. The Court of Appeals there determined that
the true test of validity is whether the challenged transfer is "real or illusory,"
in the sense of whether or not the husband in good faith (as regards intent,
not motive) divested himself of ownership of the property involved. Krause
v. Krause, supra,applied this test to a Totten trust under attack by a widow and
reached a similar conclusion: that the Totten trust was illusory because the
decedent had not sufficiently divested himself of ownership. The court in the
Krause case was not faced with the instant'problem because the will had not
been probated so as to allow final distribution of: the estate; but there seems
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little doubt that the court would have reached the same result as did the Newman case (entire failure of the trust), since the test applied and the reasoning
employed were all in terms of failure to divest. In the light of the foregoing
discussion, the present decision would seem to be erroneous.
As noted, the theory upon which a spouse challenges doubtful transfers is
not that of a direct violation of § 18, rather that the statute has been evaded.
That is to say, the spouse invokes the policy of the section. There is some
logical inconsistency in relying upon the policy of a statute when the terms
thereof preclude its direct application; here, that is, bar an election. Newman
v. Dore allowed the widow to invoke the spirit of the statute when there could
be no election, however, as did Burns v. Turnbull and Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, both supra. The present case adds a further logical difficulty; not only
was the policy of § 18 invoked when an election was barred by the will leaving
everything to the widow, but almost all of the terms of the statute were applied
as well. The spouse thus was allowed to invade the trusts but only to the exact
extent specified by the statute, just as if there had been an election. It can
well be argued, however, that the spouse should be allowed no more than her
"property right" (so termed in Newman v. Dore) which is surely limited as
well as contingent; that there is not practical need to give her more than the
statute would allow; that the result here is just - compare the position of
creditors as regards Totten trusts noted supra; and that consideration of logic
should hardly be decisive as regards Totten trusts which are anomalous by
nature in existing outside the Statute of Wills.
In Application of Halpern, the principal case, Totten trusts otherwise valid
(i.e., outside the estate) failed only partially upon a widow's attack, while in
Newman v. Dore a trust otherwise valid (expressly so assumed for purposes of
the appeal) failed completely. Stated another way, in the Newman case the
other beneficiaries of the will profited by the widow's challenge, whereas here
they would not; here of course there were no beneficiaries except the widow.
The Halpern decision was and only could be reached by ignoring the basic
approach of the Newman and Krause cases, by disregarding the failure-todivest criterion. Following that approach to the present result of partial invalidity might have necessitated a discussion in terms of divisible divestment
or some such equally implausible fiction. But if the divestment test were employed to invalidate the present trusts completely, it might possibly mean that
Totten trusts ultimately are no more secure than "Newman" trusts, which are
presumably susceptible to attack ordinarily by persons other than the widow.
Rather than suffer a diminution of the Totten magic, the court - by stressing
the special nature of Totten trusts, their longstanding sanction by the courts
and widespread use - chose to enhance the Totten doctrine and made Totten
trusts even more like wills than has been the case hitlherto-made them in effect
additional "clauses" of the will. This means that the widow's action in such
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case becomes much more like an election rather than an action to set aside an
"illusory" transfer; it becomes an election in fact for most purposes. But
even so, the widow remains excused from the procedural requirements of § 18,
that is, from actually filing an election and doing so within six months of
probate.
This decision may be termed just, considering the statute very generally.
It should not be considered sound since it was made possible by a reading of
the authorities, especially Krause v. Krause, so narrow as to vitiate their spirit.
Further, the result was achieved at the expense of additional illogical inroads
upon the statutory scheme of testamentary disposition, a course the courts
would do well to avoid.
Samuel R. Miserendino
Robert B. Fleming
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
"ACCIDENTAL INJURY" AS A QUESTION OF. FACT
Decedent steamfitter having a congenial aneurysm of a cerebral artery
collapsed immediately after emerging from a boiler which he had been cleaning. The temperature inside the boiler was above normal and the working
space limited; the work was such that it had to be performed in twenty to
thirty minute relays. Death was caused by rupture of the defective artery and
subsequent hemorrhage. The employer contended death was due to a cQndition, not an accident. Held: award of death benefits affirmed; whether an
injury was accidental, and thus compensable within the meaning of § 2(7),
N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law, is a question of fact on which the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board is conclusive. Broderick v.
Liebmann Breweries, 277 App. Div. 422, 100 N. Y. S. 837 (Nov. 1950) [all
compensation appeals are handled by the 3d Department.]
In determining the appropriate scope of review for a finding on a mixed
issue of law and fact, the court here adopted a fresh approach to compensation
appeals, one that emphasizes the administrative law aspect of compensation.
Mixed issues have given the courts difficulty because the statutory directives
regarding review are predicated on the traditional law/fact clasiification: fact
findings of the Board are conclusive on review, but the courts are free to correct errors of law. N.Y. Work. Comp. Law, § 20, see BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEw YORK, first volume, p. 347. The substantial evidence
test is applied to fact findings, however, so that they are conclusive only if there
is substantial evidence to sustain them, and if that is determined the courts will
not reweigh the evidence. Matter of Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co.,
256 N. Y. 199, 176 N. E. 141 (1931), affd, 284 U. S. 594 (1931). The law
versus fact distinction may be of little use however when the disputed issue is
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